An algorithm is presented in this note for determining all Berge equilibria for an n-person game in normal form. This algorithm is based on the notion of disappointment, with the payoff matrix (PM) being transformed into a disappointment matrix (DM). The DM has the property that a pure strategy profile of the PM is a BE if and only if (0,. . .,0) is the corresponding entry of the DM. Furthermore, any (0,. . .,0) entry of the DM is also a more restrictive Berge-Vaisman equilibrium if and only if each player's BE payoff is at least as large as the player's maximin security level.
Introduction
In a Berge equilibrium (BE) for an -person game, every − 1 player has pure strategies that maximized the remaining player's payoff. The BE was intuitively defined for pure strategies in [1] as a refinement to the Nash equilibrium (NE) [2] . The BE was formalized in [3] as a game-theoretic solution concept modeling mutual support and cooperation, as opposed to the selfishness of the NE. However, the BE was not studied extensively until recently. For example, see [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . Only [6, 7] offer approaches for obtaining BEs, though, and these methods are stated abstractly without examples.
A simple algorithm is presented here for computing all BEs for an -person game = ( , ( ) ∈ , ( ) ∈ ) in normal form, with = {1, . . . , } the set of players, the finite set of pure strategies for player , and ( 1 , . . . , ) the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of player for a pure strategy profile = ( 1 , . . . , ) ∈ × ∈ = . The BE is defined as follows, where an incomplete strategy profile − = ( 1 , . . . , −1 , +1 , . . . , ) denotes a member of − = × ∈ \{ } .
Definition 1. The strategy profile
* is a BE of if and only if
The BE * is further called a Berge-Vaisman equilibrium (BVE) if and only if the maximin security levels of the players satisfy
so that no player is guaranteed better payoff than that given by * .
In Section 2 we define the disappointment matrix (DM) corresponding to the payoff matrix (PM) for and prove that a pure strategy * is a BE if and only if (0, . . . , 0) is the corresponding entry of the DM. In Section 3 the approach of Section 2 is formalized as an algorithm to obtain all BEs and BVEs for . In Section 4 a computational example is presented for = 3.
The Disappointment Matrix
The disappointment function is defined as a transformation of a player's payoffs to losses. Game Theory 
The disappointment incurred by player for a strategy profile = ( , − ) is thus the difference between the best payoff that player could obtain by choosing and the actual payoff that player would obtain for the strategy profile ( , − ). This definition immediately gives the following result. Proof. The strategy profile * is a BE if and only if it satisfies (1) of Definition 1. However, (1) holds if and only if ( * ) = 0 in (3) for all ∈ . To complete the proof, the BE * is also a BVE if and only if it satisfies (2).
The DM of a game is now defined.
Definition 4.
The disappointment matrix of is the matrix obtained from its PM by replacing ( 1 ( ), . . . , ( )) by ( 1 ( ), . . . , ( )) for all ∈ .
Algorithm
Consider the game in which each player ∈ has pure strategies. Denote the th strategy of player by , = 1, . . . , . Algorithm 1 describes the algorithm BECOMP for obtaining all BEs and BVEs for from its DM. The computational complexity of BECOMP is ( ∏ =1 ) because of the unavoidable enumeration in Step 4 of all strategy profiles ( , − ), = 1, . . . , , for each player .
Example
For = 3 we use the notation of BECOMP with 1 = 2 = 3 = 2 and consider the game with a PM of Table 1 . The DM for is obtained from the PM via BECOMP and (1, 0, 0) (0, 3, 2) (0, 0, 0) (3, 3, 1) shown in Table 2 . The unique BE for is * = ( 
